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2“Risky Business”
Space launch systems are inherently risky 
endeavors
– It takes a tremendous amount of energy to get to orbit
– Highly energetic systems must be designed, 
manufactured, assembled, and operated
– Launch environments are harsh
– Desire for high-performance often results in very 
complex designs with low margins
– Production rates are relatively low, yet often complex
The launch vehicle’s basic mission is to deliver 
people and/or high dollar investments to orbit
– The consequences of failure are significant 
3Managing Risks
Managing a “risky business” warrants careful 
attention to:
– identifying and characterizing risks
– mitigating risks to “acceptable levels”
– verifying the desired mitigations are in place
– monitoring performance to assure mitigations 
perform as expected over time
“Risk comes from not knowing what you`re doing.” 
Warren Buffett 1930- , American Investment Entrepreneur
4“Know Your Risks”
• Identifying and characterizing the safety 
and mission success risks associated with 
a space launch system is no simple task.
• There are many sources of these risks, 
spanning from:
– the harsh environments they operate in
– design complexities driven by needs for high-
performance
– complex interactions within the system and its 
external interfaces
– hardware failure mechanisms
– reliance on software to fly the vehicle
– low manufacturing production rates coupled with 
the need for high-quality products 
5Thoughts
Thoughts from the Last 30 Years
of the Space Shuttle Program
6People
• People are your most Important Resource to 
assure Flight Safety And Mission Success. Value 
them.
• Open Communication Should Be the Standard 
that is embraced by the Highest Management to 
the Line Supervisor. Never tolerate Retribution for 
Speaking Up. If the King Has No Clothes, Tell Him.
• Beware of Normalization of Deviance.
• Be Willing to Make a Decision.
7FLIGHT RATIONALE
• All Flight Rationale Should Contain These 
Elements:
• Solid Technical Understanding
• Condition Relative to Experience Base
• Bounding Case Established
• Self-Limiting Aspect
• Margins Understood
• Assessment Based on Data, Testing, and Analysis
• Interactions with Other Elements/Conditions Addressed
8Stay Humble – You are never as smart as you think you are
• Invest early in good, multi-disciplined, structured 
brainstorming about possible failure modes for each 
component. (FMEA/CIL and Hazards Analysis are great, established 
tools for doing this!) It will pay off.
• Launch vehicles operate on the edge of technical 
feasibility and in a regime frequently beyond your 
engineering intuition.  Pocketing
• Margin and fault tolerance are essential when you design 
on the edge.
• Test what you fly and fly what you test.  Test at the corners of 
the Box. (Challenger)
• Resist Cutting Test Because of Budget Issues.
9Communications and Making Good Decisions
• Always seek out dissenting opinions. Beware of Group 
Think.
• Listen to your hardware.  It is always talking to you.  (External 
Tank)
• Major decision meetings (Flight Readiness Reviews, Critical 
Design Reviews) need to be held face-to-face. 
• Reward people for speaking up.
10
Communications and Making Good Decisions
• Challenge analyses, especially from models that are not anchored with 
actual empirical data.  Have a good understanding of the assumptions in 
the models. 
• Listen with an open mind.  When you focus on the end answer, you 
tend to hear things only with an ear to confirm what you want that end 
answer to be (Confirmation bias).
• Cheating Gravity is hard to do.  You do the best you can and make the 
best decisions that you possibly can, and sometimes you’ll be wrong.  
Margin and fault tolerance.  (STS-78 PSA)
• It is always better to determine the condition of a suspect component 
(via direct measurement or observation) than it is to infer its condition via 
indirect measurement or observation or, worse yet, analysis. (Columbia 
wing on-orbit)
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Communications and Making Good Decisions
• Both Columbia and Challenger were brought down by 
known problems that were being managed, not by 
somebody missing something or some new failure mode.  
You must critically challenge MRs, problem reports, etc., 
and get them right! 
• Guard against compartmentalization.  Don’t be a 
bystander and assume that somebody else who knows a 
lot more about the subject isn’t worried about the question in 
your mind. Sometimes the sponsors are engaging in wishful 
thinking.  Be courageous and ask what you think is the 
obvious question. Don’t Check Your Brain at the Door.
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Communications and Making Good Decisions
• When a technical matter is presented to you for decision, 
play it back to presenters in your own words.
• Risk tolerance goes way up as a deadline or milestone 
approaches.  Guard against it.  Someone’s life may be 
depending on it.
• Know your team.  Be there for them.  Things at home affect 
how decisions are made.
13
Communications and Making Good Decisions
• You’re never as smart as you think you are.  If a team 
member (analyst, subsystem manager, chief engineer, etc.) 
habitually comes across as dead sure on technical matters, 
then they haven’t learned this lesson yet.  
• Cost and schedule pressures are always present and 
real, but don’t let them box you into thinking that stand-
down is not a real option.  It is.  Don’t say, “Well, we have to 
do it this way or we can’t fly.”  Sometimes you, indeed, can’t 
fly.
• Make sure your team is willing to speak up and 
challenge technical presentations, no matter who is 
presenting.  Speaking up is tough.    (STS-112 FRR)
14
People
15
A Final Reminder
“A worker at KSC told me that they haven't heard any NASA managers admit to being at 
fault for the loss of Columbia. I cannot speak for others, but let me set my record 
straight: I am at fault.  If you need a scapegoat, start with me. I had the opportunity and 
the information and I failed to make use of it. I don't know what an inquest or a court of 
law would say, but I stand condemned in the court of my own conscience to be guilty of 
not preventing the Columbia disaster. We could discuss the particulars: inattention, 
incompetence, distraction, lack of conviction, lack of understanding, a lack of backbone, 
laziness. The bottom line is that I failed to understand what I was being told; I failed to 
stand up and be counted. Therefore, look no further; I am guilty of allowing Columbia to 
crash. 
As you consider continuing in this program, or any other high risk program, weigh the 
cost. You, too, could be convicted in the court of your conscience if you are ever party to 
cutting corners, believing something life and death is not your responsibility, or simply 
not paying attention. The penalty is heavy, you can never completely repay it. 
Do good work. Pay attention. Question everything. Be thorough. Don't end up with 
regrets.”
---Wayne Hale
